Abstract. The block ciphers MISTY1 and MISTY2 proposed by Matsui are based on the principle of provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. This paper presents attacks on reduced-round variants of both ciphers, without as well as with the key-dependent linear functions FL. The attacks employ collision-searching techniques and impossible differentials. KASUMI, a MISTY variant to be used in next generation cellular phones, can be attacked with the latter method faster than brute force when reduced to six sounds.
Introduction
The MISTY algorithms proposed by Matsui [8] are designed to be resistant against differential [3] and linear [7] cryptanalysis. One design criterion is that no single differential or linear characteristic with a usable probability does hold for the cipher. An additional feature is the use of key-dependent linear functions which were introduced to counter other than differential and linear attacks.
Previous attacks by Tanaka, Hisamatsu and Kaneko [12] on MISTY1 and by Sugita [10] on MISTY2 employ higher order differentials against 5-round variants without the linear FL functions. A cryptographic weakness of the round construction of MISTY2 was pointed out by Sakurai and Zheng [9] .
In this paper we present attacks on reduced-round variants of MISTY1 and MISTY2, both without and with the key-dependent linear functions FL. The round function involves a huge amount of keying material, so it is one purpose of this paper to point out properties of the round function that allow to use divideand-conquer techniques on the subkeys in order to improve basic attacks which make use of impossible differentials [2, 5] and collision-searching [1] ; the latter technique is extended by using multiple permutations. Furthermore reducedround KASUMI, a MISTY variant to be used in next generation cellular phones, is attacked with impossible differentials. Table 1 shows a summary of the attacks. This paper is organised as follows. The MISTY algorithms are described in Section 2; properties of the key scheduling and the round function that are used here are explained in Section 3; the new attacks on MISTY1 resp. MISTY2 are described in Section 4 resp. 5. A comparison to KASUMI is made in Section 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7. 
Description of MISTY
The MISTY algorithms [8] are symmetric block ciphers with a block size of 64 bits and a key size of 128 bits. There are two flavors called MISTY1 and MISTY2, which differ by their global structure (see Figure 1 ). MISTY1 is a Feistel network with additional key-dependent linear functions FL placed in the data path before every second round. MISTY2 has a different structure that allows parallel execution of round functions during encryption. The FL functions are applied in MISTY2 to both halfs of the data before every fourth round and also in every second round just before XORing the right to the left half of the data. In both ciphers the linear functions are also used as an output transformation. MISTY has a recursive structure, that is, the round function consists of a network with a smaller block size using the function FI that itself is again a smaller network; the structure of both the round function FO and the function FI is that of MISTY2. Figure 2 shows FO, FI and FL in a representation that is equivalent to the original description [8] . This equivalent description 1 is the result moving the mixing of the leftmost seven bits of each KI ij in each FI (as given in the specification [8] ) out of FI and to the end of its superstructure FO; this is possible because these key bits do not affect any S-box inside the instance of FI where they are inserted. Due to the recursive structure a huge amount of keying material is involved in each round, i.e. 112 bits for FO in MISTY1   ?   64  32 32 (  (  (  (  (  (  (   ?   MISTY2   ?   64  32 32 the original description; the equivalent description has a key size of 107 bits. Additional subkey bits are used if the round contains FL functions. The ciphers are proposed with 8 (MISTY1) resp. 12 (MISTY2) rounds.
The key scheduling takes as input a 128 bit key consisting of 16 bit values K 1 , . . . , K 8 and computes additional 16 bit values K t = FI Kt+1 (K t ), 1 ≤ t ≤ 8 where K 9 = K 1 . The subkeys of each round are (i is identified with i − 8 for i > 8):
The functions FO and FI in a form equivalent to the original specification which eliminates the left 7 bits of the key to FI. S7 and S9 are bijective 7 × 7 resp. 9 × 9 S-boxes; in FL the operators ∩ resp. ∪ denote the bitwise AND resp. OR. 
Notation. Throughout this paper all differences are taken as XOR of the appropriate values. Let L i resp. R i denote the left resp. right half of the input to round i, X i the input to the round function FO, and Z i its output; so L 1 resp. R 1 denotes the left resp. right half of the plaintext data. If round i uses FL in its data path (for example every odd round in MISTY1) let X i resp. Y i denote the left resp. right half of the data after the transformation through FL, and set
For MISTY2 letỸ i denote the possibly transformed value of Y i that is XORed to Z i to form the half of the round's output that becomes R i+1 after the swap.
Observations on the Key Scheduling and the Round Function
Key Scheduling. The key scheduling is designed such that every round is affected by all key bits. This causes major problems in terms of complexity when exhaustively guessing the subkey of one round with a distinguisher for the other rounds, but it also allows to recover the whole key with reasonable effort once a large part of one round subkey is known. For example consider the first round's subkeys AKO 11 , AKO 12 , AKO 13 and AKI 11 , AKI 12 , AKI 13 . By equation 1 (and the key scheduling table in Section 2) the 16 bits of key words K 1 and K 3 are known. AKI 12 resp. AKI 13 provides a 9 bit condition for K 2 resp. K 4 and K 5 . After guessing the 7 bits of KI 11 in AKO 13 there is -knowing AKI 11 -a 16 bit condition for K 6 and K 7 ; also the word K 8 is known from AKO 13 . Using a factor of 2 for the 8 computations of FI in the key schedule the total complexity of exhaustive search is about 2 · 2 128−32 · 2 −9 · 2 −9 · 2 −32 = 2 47 encryptions using two or three known plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts.
Round function in differential and collision-searching attacks. The subkeys AKO i4 and AKO i5 are invisible in our attacks as they introduce fixed constants after all non-linearities when FO is applied in forward direction. The following properties of FO allow divide-and-conquer techniques for the other 75 subkey bits at the cost of increased chosen plaintext or ciphertext requirements. Property 1. In forward direction, consider FO in round i having an output XOR of the form (β, β) where β is a nonzero 16 bit value. Then the input and output XOR of the third instance of FI must be zero, so (AKO i3 , AKI i3 ) does not influence the output XOR. The input XOR to FO must be (α l , α r ) such that α r cancels the output XOR of the first FI under key (AKO i1 , AKI i1 ) when the input XOR is α l from the given input values. The value of β is solely influenced by (AKO i2 , AKI i2 ). Property 2. In forward direction, consider inputs to FO in round i of the form (a i , b) where the a i are all different (thus forming a permutation in the notation of [1] ) and b is a constant. Then the output of the second FI is a constant that depends on AKO i2 and AKI i2 ; the input of the third FI is a permutation, namely the XOR of the output of the first FI and b ⊕ AKO i2 ⊕ AKO i3 . As long as AKO i2 ⊕ AKO i3 has the same value as for the unknown key, and AKO i1 , AKI i1 and AKI i3 are also correct, the output of FO is the same as for the correct subkey, up to XORing with a constant. So one can set AKO i2 = 0, AKI i2 = 0 in a first step, making sure that AKO i2 ⊕ AKO i3 has the correct value.
Directional Asymmetry. Due to the Feistel network, FO is used in MISTY1 in forward direction both for encrypting and decrypting data. But for MISTY2 this is not the case. In forward direction the output of the second FI does not affect the input of the third FI; this fact is inherently used in both properties explained above. In backward direction, the output of the first and second FI each affect the input of every subsequent FI, which makes analysis harder in this direction. This is the reason that for MISTY2 the attacks presented in this paper use the chosen ciphertext model of attack, as then FO in the first round can be used in forward direction.
Attacks on Reduced-Round MISTY1
In this section we present attacks on MISTY1; it is assumed that the final swap of MISTY is also present in the reduced variant. One attack finds the last round subkey of 6 rounds of MISTY1 without FL functions, other attacks find the last round subkey of MISTY1 reduced to 4 rounds with FL functions but without the final output transformation; these attacks break exactly half of the cipher.
Attacking MISTY1 without FL Functions
This attack is based on the generic 5-round impossible differential for Feistel networks with bijective round functions
discovered by Knudsen [5] . The attack looks for differences (β l , β r , α l , α r ) after 6 rounds (including the final swap) and rules out all subkeys that can yield (α l , α r ) → (β l , β r ) from the given outputs, as that is impossible. The basic attack uses a structure of 2 32 chosen plaintexts P i = (x, y, a i , b i ) with some fixed values x, y and (a i , b i ) running through all 2 32 values. After obtaining the corresponding ciphertexts (c i , d i , e i , f i ) by encryption under the unknown key set up a list of values w i = (a i , b i ) ⊕ (e i , f i ). For a pair i, j such that w i = w j the input difference is (0, 0, α l , α r ) with (α l , α r ) = (a i ⊕ a j , b i ⊕ b j ); the output difference after six rounds and the final swap is (β l , β r , α l , α r ) with (
. Such a subkey is wrong while a correct guess never yields this difference. About
2 · 2 −32 ≈ 2 31 pairs w i = w j are expected in a structure. A wrong key has a probability of about 2 −32 to cause a given output XOR, so a fraction of (1 − 2 −32 ) 2 31 = e −1/2 of the wrong subkeys are discarded. After repeating this basic step 75/ log 2 (e 1/2 ) ≈ 104 times only the correct subkey is expected to survive.
This attack takes about 104·2 32 ≈ 2 39 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity is 2 · 2 31 computations of FO per guessed key and per structure, so the total complexity is about
108.4 evaluations of FO which is equivalent to about 2 106 encryptions of 6-round MISTY1 without FL functions; this is hardly a practical attack.
It is possible to reduce the amount of work at the cost of increased chosen plaintext requirements using Property 1 of FO (see Section 3). Using the above structure of plaintexts and their ciphertexts set up a list of (w i , u i ) with w i = (a i ⊕ e i , b i ⊕ f i ) and u i = c i ⊕ d i . Now only matches with w i = w j and u i = u j are of interest which yield (c i , 
Attacking MISTY1 with FL Functions
Here we show two attacks on 4-round MISTY1 where FL functions are present with the exception of the final output transformation. One attack uses an impossible differential, the other uses the collision-searching technique of Biham's attack on Ladder-DES [1] ; in order to use Property 2 we extend this technique by employing multiple permutations.
Differential-style attack. The impossible differential used to attack MISTY1 without the FL functions does not work here. The problem occurs because FL changes nonzero differences.
Lemma 1. The generic 5-round impossible differential for Feistel networks does not work for MISTY1 with the keyed linear functions FL.
Proof. Assume that the differential starts at an odd-numbered round, i.e. a round where the FL functions are applied in, w.l.o.g. at round 1. The difference in the R i is changed by FL for i ∈ {1, 3, 5}. For the impossible differential to work the differences in Y 3 and L 4 have to be the same, and thus the output XOR of the round function must be zero (which is impossible). But as the application of FL in general changes the differences, this cannot be assured. In the second case the differential starts at an even numbered round, i.e. a round where FL is not applied in; here the reasoning goes along the same lines.
The following 3-round impossible differential does work since FL cannot change zero differences. An input difference (0, Attack using collisions. Biham's attack on Ladder-DES [1] is also applicable to 4 round MISTY1 with FL functions, as these are bijective and thus cannot produce collisions. Consider a collection of chosen plaintexts of the form (x, y, a i , b i ) with i ∈ I for some index set I where x, y are constants and (a i , b i ) different random values. Using the notation from [1] this property of the collection of {(a i , b i )} i∈I is called a permutation, that is, there can be no collision. By the FL functions X 1 is a constant (x , y ), and Y 1 is a permutation, say {(a i , b i )} i∈I . Z 1 is another fixed constant (x , y ) derived from (x , y ) by FO, so L 2 = X 2 is the permutation {(a i ⊕ x , b i ⊕ y )} i∈I while R 2 = Y 2 is constant. Then Z 2 is yet another permutation, and so is L 3 . X 3 is still a permutation after the FL in round 3, as is Z 3 , but Z 3 ⊕ Y 3 behaves like a pseudo-random function.
The attack proceeds as follows. Prepare 2 20 plaintexts P i = (x, y, a i , b i ) and get their encryptions C i = (c i , d i , e i , f i ) under the unknown key. For all guesses k = (AKO 41 , AKI 41 , . . . , AKO 43 , AKI 43 ) of the last round's FO 75 bit key decrypt the ciphertexts one round
If w i = w j for some i, j then the key guess is wrong. The one-round decryption with a wrong key behaves like a pseudo-random function, so on average about 2 16 decryptions are needed to eliminate a wrong guess; a correct guess never produces a collision. 
, so for all keys the probability for a false guess to survive is 2 −109 . This attack can be improved using Property 2 at the cost of more chosen plaintexts. This version uses 2 28 chosen plaintexts P i = (x, y, a i , b i ) with constants x, y and all different (a i , b i ). The ciphertexts 28 chosen plaintexts). The first part uses several permutations, with the complication that the sum of the number of elements over all permutations is a constant. The probability of success can be estimated using methods from convexity theory [6] ; we show that the case that all permutations are of equal size is the worst case. Let m t = |B t | and N = 2 32 . For each B t a wrong key survives the test with probability
) with 0 ≤ |m t | ≤ 2 28 and
The product of all p t is the probability of failure to eliminate the wrong key. It follows that also the probability is negligible that a single wrong key guess survives the first part. The probability that a wrong guess survives in the second part is, by the birthday paradox, about 2 −184 , so for all 25 key bits this is about 2 −159 which is also negligible.
Attacks on Reduced-Round MISTY2
While the attacks given in this section work for 5-round MISTY2 both with and without FL functions, the attacks on MISTY2 without FL functions have a much higher complexity than the one given in [10] ; therefore we present here only the attacks on MISTY2 with FL functions; again we assume that the final swap but no output transformation is present.
Because of the asymmetry of the round function described in Section 3 it seems to help to attack MISTY2 in the chosen ciphertext model, as then the round function is used in the forward direction when testing a guessed value of a subkey.
Differential-style attack. This attack on 5-round MISTY2 makes use of the following impossible differential: Proposition 1. Given MISTY2 without FL, any input XOR (α l , α r , 0, 0) with nonzero (α l , α r ) to round i cannot yield a difference (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ) for any (δ 1 , δ 2 ) in round i + 3. Conversely, a difference (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ), (δ 1 , δ 2 ) = (0, 0), in round i + 3 cannot decrypt to a difference (α l , α r , 0, 0) before round i.
For MISTY2 with FL functions this differential is also impossible provided thatỸ i+3 = Y i+3 , i.e. round i + 3 does not apply FL to the right half before it is XORed to the left half.
Proof. This differential uses the miss-in-the-middle approach (see [2] ) where two differentials with probability 1 are concatenated such that a contradiction arises. The 2-round differential used here has input difference (α l , α r , 0, 0) and output difference (β 1 , β 2 , β 1 , β 2 ) which happens with probability 1. The input difference of (α l , α r , 0, 0) causes a nonzero input difference for the first FO, which then becomes output difference (β 1 , β 2 ) = (0, 0) as FO is bijective. The XOR with the right hand side zero difference does not change this. So at the beginning of round 2 the difference is (0, 0, β 1 , β 2 ) which FO cannot change. After round 2 the difference is (β 1 , β 2 , β 1 , β 2 ). The same reasoning works for the backwards direction, where an output difference (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0) decrypts always to (γ 1 , γ 2 , 0, 0). Connecting two instances of this differential yields the contradiction.
When FL functions are present, the assumption on round i + 3 ensures that the output difference of FO in this round is zero. Application of FL in the first two rounds cannot yield a zero difference in the right half input to round i + 2, so the contradiction between rounds i + 1 and i + 2 still occurs.
In oder to use this impossible differential the condition of a missing FL function in the last round must be met. From the specification of MISTY2 it is clear that if a group of 4 rounds does not employ FL functions in the fourth round the round preceeding this group also does not use FL, so no additional key material has to be guessed besides the subkey for FO. This holds for example for rounds 2 to 6.
The attack works as follows. Set up a structure of 2 16 ciphertexts C i = (e i , f i , e i ⊕ x, f i ⊕ y) where x, y are constants and (e i , f i ) are different values. Get the plaintexts P i = (a i , b i , c i , d i ) by decryption under the unknown key. Every pair of ciphertexts fulfills the ciphertext condition of the impossible differential. For each pair P i , P j any key k to the first round that encrypts P i and P j to a difference (α 1 , α 2 , 0, 0) must be a wrong guess, while a correct guess never yields such a contradiction. There are about 2 31 such pairs, so that a fraction of (1−2 −32 ) decryptions. An improvement of the work factor can be reached using Property 1 in a similar way as for MISTY1 in sections 4.1 and 4.2. For the attack we use the same structures as above. From their decryptions P i = (a i , b i , c i , d i ) we make a list w i = c i ⊕d i . All matches w i = w j , i = j yield a plaintext difference P i ⊕P j = (α l , α r , β, β) for some value of β; these are the analysed pairs. With the input resp. output XOR (α l , α r ) resp. (β, β) for FO in the first round we determine subkeys (AKO 11 , AKI 11 ), (AKO 12 , AKI 12 ) that yield this output difference from (a i , b i ) and (a j , b j ) as follows. For each (AKO 11 , AKI 11 ) we check if the first FI gives output XOR α r from a i , a j . Then each guess for (AKO 12 , AKI 12 ) is checked if it yields output XOR β by the second FI. Each part is expected to result in about 2 9 candidates due to the 16 bit restriction. Each of the expected 2 18 combinations is a wrong guess by the impossible differential. Attack using collisions. This attack on 5-round MISTY2 with FL functions but without the output transformation works with collision-searching; it is based on the following observation in the chosen ciphertext model.
Proposition 2.
Given four rounds of MISTY2 starting at round n such that Y n+3 = Y n+3 holds, i.e. Y n+3 is not transformed via FL before the XOR. Assume that no output transformation with FL takes place. Given a set of ciphertexts C i = (e i , f i , x ⊕ e i , y ⊕ f i ) where x, y are constant and {(e i , f i )} form a permutation. After decryption the right half R n is a permutation.
Proof. Z n+3 is always the constant (x, y) and thus X n+3 as well as L n+3 is a constant, say (x , y ). On the other hand, R n+3 is the permutation {(e i , f i )}. After being XORed with (x , y ) this becomes Z n+2 , so that also X n+2 and L n+2 are permutations while R n+2 is a constant. Z n+1 is a permutation which is the XOR of a constant and a permutationỸ n+1 which is L n+2 possibly transformed by an instance of FL. So X n+1 is a permutation. Now the claim follows.
The attack using Proposition 2 works for example on the five rounds of MISTY2 from round 2 to round 6. Both round 2 and round 6 do not apply any FL functions. An attack using 2 89 work and 2 20 chosen ciphertexts works straightforward as in section 4.2 with the same analysis, so the detailed description is omitted here.
In order to use the observation on reducing the amount key material to be guessed the attack uses 2 28 chosen ciphertexts of the form C i = (e i , f i , x ⊕ e i , y ⊕f i ) where x, y are constants and {(e i , f i )} form a permutation. Encryption under the unknown key yields plaintexts P i = (a i , b i , c i , d i ) which we partition into 2 16 sets B t such that P i ∈ B bi ; thus all P i ∈ B t for a given t have the same value b i = t. First, set AKO i1 = 0, AKI 12 = 0. For each 50 bit key guess k = (AKO 11 , AKI 11 , k 23 , AKI 13 ) with k 23 in the role of AKO 13 , and for each B t , t ∈ {0, . . . , 2
16 − 1} encrypt all P i ∈ B t one round yielding w chosen ciphertexts). The probability that a wrong key guess survives is bounded with the same arguments as in Section 4.2 by Lemma 2 and the birthday paradox, so the details are omitted here.
Comparison to KASUMI
The algorithm KASUMI [4] is a MISTY variant that is to be used in nextgeneration cellular phones. The global structure is a Feistel network with 8 rounds including the final permutation. Its round function consists of FO and FL, applied before resp. after FO in odd resp. even-numbered rounds. The FO function has the same structure as in MISTY with the subkeys KO ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 being applied by XOR before FI but a lacking final XOR of KO i4 after all non-linearities; the FI function involves an additional fourth round, and the FL function uses left rotations by one bit before each XOR. The S-boxes S7 and S9 are bijective, but different from those of MISTY. Each round uses 128 key bits, 32 bits for FL and 96 bits for FO. These are derived by revolving through the key bytes and applying rotations and bitwise additions of constants.
The usage of the basic Feistel structure without FL functions in the data path makes KASUMI susceptible to an attack based on the same 5-round impossible differential as used in Section 4.1, but with the additional difficulty that FL is part of the round functions and FO uses more keying material. The differential can be used as both FO and FL are bijective. It should be noted that a property similar to Property 1 does also hold for KASUMI's FO when it is preceeded by FL as it happens in odd-numbered rounds:
Property 3. Assume that the concatenation of FL and FO has a nonzero output XOR (δ, δ). Denote the input XOR to FL by (α l , α r ) and its output XOR (the input to FO) by (β l , β r ). The difference β r is solely determined by the first round of FL, so is the right half of the data in the first round of FO. In order to have the given output XOR of FO the third round's output and input XOR must both be zero which means that (KO i3 , KI i3 ) can be ignored. The output XOR (δ, δ) is determined by the second round of FO from the inputs with XOR β r ; additionally, β r is canceled by the output XOR β r of the FI in the first round of FO, coming from the left halfs of the inputs with XOR β l .
The attack on rounds 2 to 7 of KASUMI including the last swap works as follows. In round 7 the function FL is applied before FO, so we can rely on Property 3. The attack uses the same structures as were used in Section 4.1 and looks for pairs with ciphertext XOR (δ, δ, α l , α r ) with the same methods. We expect about such 2 15 pairs per structure which will be analysed. Let (c i , d i , e i , f i ) and (c j , d j , e j , f j ) be such a pair. In order to use Property K we first fix a guess of the first round subkey KL 71 of FL in round 7, yielding f i , f j with β r := f i ⊕ f j . Then we determine which guesses of ( 103 computations of FL and FI roughly equivalent to 2 100 encryptions. Although this is much faster than brute force it is hardly a practical attack because of the high data and work requirements.
Conclusion
For MISTY1 the use of keyed linear functions inhibits the attack using the 5-round impossible differential of Feistel networks with bijective round functions; for MISTY2 we cannot make this claim as we did not find an impossible differential longer than 4 rounds.
The attacks on MISTY2 suggest that this structure might be one round weaker than the Feistel structure, at least when the linear functions FL are present. The directional asymmetry of the MISTY2 structure used in FO with embedded 3-round FI suggests that this structure might be stronger in the backwards direction compared to the forward direction.
By adding a fourth round to FI -like done for KASUMI -its equivalent description of FO would not reduce the number of key bits, so the attacks would only need to guess 7 bits more for each FI. If FO had one more round the properties used to improve both the differential and collision-searching attacks would not hold, leaving only the basic forms of attack; but this would require more keying material.
Instead, the changes for KASUMI, i.e. adding a round to FI and employing the linear functions as part of the round function does not require more keying material and seems to make an analysis of the round function very demanding.
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